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TARGETING TERRORISTS: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION
Paul Rosenzweig'
New twenty-first century technologies, ranging from link
analysis and data-integration to biometrics and new encryption
techniques, offer great advantages in achieving the compelling
national goal of preventing terrorism. But there is substantial
political resistance to many of the new technologies. The enduring
problems in the development of a domestic air travel screening
program are but one cautionary tale.'
The resistance arises from legitimate fears: government access
to and use of personal information generates concerns about the
protection of civil liberties, privacy, and due process. But the
stirring of those fears by the advent of new technologies has given
rise to a disturbing pattern in America-a counter-reaction that
threatens to swamp not only the valuable new protective measures
being taken but also many of the tried and true, traditional means
of combating terror. There is a frequently repeated pattern where
the pendulum swings back against post-9/11 security improvements
to question not only those post-9/11 developments, but proven pre-
9/11 practices.
t Paul Rosenzweig is the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of Homeland
Security. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect the
views of the Department or any other United States government entity.
1. For years, passengers boarding domestic flights were selected for
additional screening based upon certain algorithms. This Computer Assisted
Passenger Pre-Screening system was known as CAPPS I. Because those rules were
widely known and, thus, readily avoidable, the government proposed an enhanced
watch list matching system, known as CAPPS II. CAPPS II was widely criticized and
was never implemented. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AVIATION
SECURITY: COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES SIGNIFICANT
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 30-31 (2004). Recently, DHS proposed a much
slimmed down pre-screening program (now known as Secure Flight), but that
program will not be implemented until 2008. See System of Records; Secure Flight
Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,711 (proposed Nov. 9, 2007). Thus, because of concerns
about civil liberties we have yet to fully implement a modernized domestic
passenger screening system-more than six years after September 11.
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Given the geopolitical situation today, that natural pendulum
swing is dangerous. The pre-9/11 legal regime is inconsistent with
post-9/11 reality. A return to that earlier vision is a greater threat
to security than many realize, yet that is what many in the public
sphere are urging. This pendulum swing, if unchecked, could
short-circuit national security. All the new technology in the world
will be of little use if an unwarranted fear of the loss of individual
liberty prevents the deployment of both new and old systems.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE COUNTERREVOLUTION
Historians of revolutionary movements call the political
pendulum swing back towards a pre-revolutionary state the
"Thermidor." It is named after the French month of Thermidor, in
which Robespierre was guillotined and the French Revolution
effectively ended. The counterrevolutionary impulse is not
uncommon. Change is often difficult and public institutions have a
natural impulse to swing in pendulum cycles. But, the post-9/11
Thermidor, if unchecked, bids fair to short-circuit national security.
The genesis of the post-9/11 counterrevolution is, in its
current manifestation, an elitist skepticism of the idea that the
revolution was necessary. It questions whether the terrorism we
encounter today really is any different from that of the anarchist
Red Brigades who committed acts of violence in Europe in the
1970s. In fact, in recent months we have been treated to a chorus
of critics and skeptics, including former government officials, who
have begun to downplay the seriousness of the threat that we face
in a world after September 11, 2001 . Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who
served as National Security Advisor to President Carter, is a prime
example. In a recent article in the Washington Post, he contended
that the United States is hyping the War on Terror in order to
promote a culture of fear. Dr. Brzezinski argued that the use of the
phrase "war on terror" itself caused damage-damage that is
"greater than any wild dreams entertained by the fanatical
2. The use of "Thermidor" in this fashion has become commonplace for
historians of revolutionary movements. See, e.g., CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF
REVOLUTION 205-36 (Vintage Books 1965) (1938).
3. Much of the analysis in these three paragraphs is derived from remarks
given by Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, Remarks at
Westminster College: The Battle for Our Future (Oct. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/ speeches/spl 193063865526.shtm.
5084 [Vol. 34:5
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss5/3
TARGETING TERRORISTS
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. ,4
Some critics deny that we are at war with terrorism. Others
admit that we are at war but believe that we can simply unilaterally
withdraw from the engagement; that we can simply walk away from
the field of battle. Writing in the Washington Post, on our nation's
birthday last year, William Arkin suggested that we should declare
5our own independence from the war on terror.
But any suggestion of this nature flounders on the words of
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri and their fellow travelers,
who very much think we are at war. In his fatwa of 1998, bin Laden
made an open declaration of war, starting with the false accusation
that America had declared war on Islam. Bin Laden's declaration
ended with the command, "to kill the Americans and their allies-
civilians and military... in any country in which it is possible to do
it. "6 It was not a hollow promise. In the decade that followed, bin
Laden and his cohorts plotted strikes not only against the United
States, but against the entire global system of security, safety, and
prosperity. Every time bin Laden has spoken since, including in his
recent videos, he has made no secret about his intent. He has
promised that he will continue to escalate the war.
So this is a war. And it is not a war from which we have the
luxury of unilateral disengagement. The war has been declared
upon us, upon our allies and all decent people, by ideological
fanatics with a dramatically different world view than the view of
freedom and human rights which have characterized Western
aspirations for the past hundred-plus years.
And that is why the counterrevolutionary reaction we see today
is such a grave risk. It calls into question not only the new
counterterrorism practices of the post-9/11 world, but also risks
sweeping aside with the pendulum many of the tried and true
investigative techniques that predate September 11.
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Terrorized by 'War on Terror': How a Three-Word Mantra
Has Undermined America, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2007, at B01.
5. Early Warning: A New Declaration of Independence, http://blog.
washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/07/anewdeclaration_of_independe.ht
ml (July 4, 2007, 9:00 EST).
6. Osama bin Laden, et al.,Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic
Front Statement (Feb. 23, 1998), reprinted in JAMES JAY CARAFANO & PAUL
ROSENZWEIG, WINNING THE LONG WAR: LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR FOR DEFEATING
TERRORISM AND PRESERVING FREEDOM app. 16, at 251 (2005).
2008] 5085
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II. ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS TODAY
A. The Automated Targeting System
The Automated Targeting System (ATS) serves as a prime
example. When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
published a System of Record Notice (SORN) describing the
system,7 it became the subject of excited congressional and public
commentary. Some members of Congress wildly called ATS "a
warrantless well of evidence from which any law enforcement,
regulatory, or intelligence agency could dip at will-without any
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or judicial oversight," and
suggested that it constituted a major expansion of how DHS
operated.8 The truth was much less cataclysmic.
ATS is an enforcement screening tool consisting of six
separate components, all of which rely substantially on information
in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).
ATS assists Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an operating
component of the Department of Homeland Security, in
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons or material from
entering the United States and in identifying other violations of
U.S. laws while facilitating legitimate trade and travel across the
U.S. borders. It is the cornerstone for all CBP targeting efforts.
1. How the Automated Targeting System Is Used
ATS data has been a proven resource for connecting the dots
associated with terrorist activity and serious transnational crime.
Investigations after the September 1 1th attacks showed that more
comprehensive and immediate access to data and analytical tools,
like those in ATS, might have facilitated interdiction of the
nineteen hijackers at the time of their entrance into the United
7. See System of Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,543 (proposed Nov. 2, 2006)
(initial publication); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Automated Targeting
System, System of Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,650 (proposed August 6, 2007) (final
SORN). DHS also published a Privacy Impact Assessment for ATS. See DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED TARGETING
SYSTEM (Nov. 22, 2006).
8. See Marc Perelman, D.H.S. Traveler Screening System under Fire from Privacy
Advocates, NAT. J., Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0907/092
807njl.htm. DHS received over 600 comments on SORN. For comments and
responses regarding SORN, see DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DISCUSSION OF PUBLIC
COMMENTS RECEIVED ON THE AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEM (2006).
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States by linking their methods of payment, phone numbers, and
seat assignments.9
One component of ATS, known as ATS-P (for "Passenger"),
was of particular concern to some in the public.' ° ATS-P is a
passenger screening module that compares data that passengers
provide to the airlines (known as Passenger Name Records (PNR)
and Advanced Passenger Information (API)) with law enforcement
lookouts and threat-based scenarios. This allows law enforcement
officials to identify patterns of suspicious activity. The scenarios are
drawn from previous and current law enforcement and intelligence
information. In short, ATS assists CBP in making assessments of
persons and cargo prior to their arrival in the United States based
on information DHS receives in advance.
Most importantly, for purposes of discussion, this information
is relevant to the decision whether to admit someone into the
country and is data that DHS would otherwise be authorized to
collect at the point of entry.12 But ATS does not replace human
decision making. It is a decision support tool for use by law
enforcement officials and does nothing more than assist the border
authorities in targeting scarce inspection resources at those
9. See Newton N. Minnow, Seven Clicks Away, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2004, at
A14; see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM: REPORT OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITEE 45-46
(2004).
10. ATS consists of six modules that provide selectivity and targeting
capability to support CBP inspection and enforcement activities: ATS-Inbound-
inbound cargo and conveyances (rail, truck, ship, and air); ATS-Outbound-
outbound cargo and conveyances (rail, truck, ship, and air); ATS-Passenger (ATS-
P)-travelers and conveyances (air, ship, and rail); ATS-Land (ATS-L)-private
vehicles arriving by land; ATS-International (ATS-I)-cargo targeting for CBP's
collaboration with foreign customs authorities (in development); and ATS-Trend
Analysis and Analytical Selectivity Program (ATS-TAP) (analytical module).
11. Thus, ATS is based on non-invidious facts and scenarios. It does not
profile on race, ethnicity, or arbitrary assumptions.
12. Congress, since the beginning of our government, "has granted the
Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the
border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of
duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country." United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, construed in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17
(1977)). "It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent
authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial
integrity." United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004). That
plenary authority includes, inter alia, the authority to stop and question individuals
at the border in order to determine their admissibility. SeeTabbaa v. Chertoff, No.
05-CV-582S, 2005 WL 3531828, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005).
50872008]
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travelers who appear to pose a greater risk. In short, ATS is
employed as an analytical tool to enhance CBP screening and
targeting capabilities by permitting query-based comparisons of
different data modules associated with the data holdings of CBP, as
well as comparisons with data sets from sources outside of CBP.
Without ATS, the United States would be significantly
impaired in its efforts to identify potential threats until after they
have entered the United States, and screening at points of entry
would be slower and more cumbersome. Port of entry risk
assessment is an analysis of the threat-based scenario(s) that a
passenger matched when traveling on a given flight. CBP uses ATS
to: improve the collection, use, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence; target, identify, and prevent potential terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States; and identify
other violations and violators of U.S. law. In this way, ATS allows
CBP officers to more effectively and efficiently focus their efforts
on cargo shipments and travelers that most warrant further
attention. In lieu of manual reviews of traveler information and
intensive interviews with every traveler arriving in or departing
from the United States, ATS-P allows CBP personnel to focus their
efforts on potentially high-risk passengers.
A couple of examples demonstrate the utility of this system of
analysis. In June 2003, using PNR data and other analytics, one of
CBP's inspectors at Chicago's O'Hare airport pulled aside an
individual, Ra'ed al-Banna, for secondary inspection and
questioning. When the secondary officers were not satisfied with al-
Banna's answers they took his fingerprints and denied him entry to
the United States. The next time we saw those fingerprints--or at
least parts of them-they were left by a suicide bomber in a car he
had blown up, killing 132 people in Iraq. Was al-Banna planning a
suicide attack in America? Now, nobody will ever know.
Somewhat more prosaically, in January 2003, CBP in Miami
used PNR to disrupt an internal airline conspiracy to smuggle
cocaine between Venezuela and Miami. A corrupt ticket counter
agent would identify low-risk travelers (typically families) and add
an additional bag to their reservation after they departed the ticket
counter. This bag would be filled with cocaine. Corrupt airline
employees in Miami were scheduled to remove the added bagsS •13
from circulation prior to inspection by CBP in Miami. That
13. Letter from Michael Chertoff, Sec'y of the Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
5088 [Vol. 34:5
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loophole is now closed-the ATS system has a targeting rule that
provides closer screening of luggage that is checked in after the
traveler has checked in.
2. The Debate over the Automated Targeting System
When DHS published a SORN regarding the ATS system,
many called it a new intrusion that should be rejected. 4 These calls
are a classic counterrevolutionary pendulum reaction. In reality,
the system is not a new one, and those who challenge it are actually
seeking a reduction in the types of scrutiny for international
passengers from the level that existed on September 10, 2001.
ATS-P first became operational in 1999, and CBP began receiving
PNR data voluntarily from air carriers in 1997.5 Today, CBP
collects this information as part of its border enforcement mission
and pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of
2001 (ATSA).
16
A second counterrevolutionary myth is that the ATS-P is
somehow a "secret" system that covertly judges Americans and their
suitability for travel. Little could be further from the truth. In fact,
targeting of passenger information was widely known and full7
complies with all applicable U.S. laws relating to privacy.
Individuals, regardless of citizenship, may seek access to most of
their information in the ATS database. Through FOIA, the Privacy
Act, and as a matter of CBP policy, individuals may obtain any of
their PNR information collected in ATS, or information used by
ATS originating from another government source system.
Finally, ATS has operated without any documented
improprieties since its inception. Access to ATS is strictly
controlled-it may only be accessed by personnel with a need to
access information in the course of completing their official duties.
Indeed, ATS employs auditing systems to identify unauthorized
Members of the European Parliament (May 14, 2007), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/press_chertoffltreuroparliament2007
0514.pdf.
14. See supra note 8.
15. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Automated Targeting System,
System of Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,650, 43,651 (Aug. 6, 2007) (reciting the history
of ATS).
16. Air Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903, 44909, 19 C.F.R. 122.49(b) (2005)).
17. See Shane Harris, No Secret...Maybe, NAT.J., Dec. 8, 2006, http://national
journal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/1208nj2.htm.
2008] 5089
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access and misuse, and DHS punishes transgressions whenever they
are identified. Significant system safeguards have been
implemented to protect the traveling public from the unauthorized
disclosure of their personal information.
In short, ATS is an old, well-designed system that is being put
to new uses in the counterterrorism field. And yet, the discussion
of this tool in the counterterrorism context has caused some to
question the tool itself and urge a retrenchment that would actually
provide less protection for America than existed prior to 9/11.
That sort of counterrevolutionary pendulum swing needs to be
recognized for what it is and resisted at all costs.
B. The National Applications Office
A similar counterrevolutionary reaction occurred with the
announcement by DHS of the creation of a National Application
Office, to coordinate the use of "national technical means" (i.e.
satellites) for homeland security purposes. This new office was
portrayed in Congress s and the press as a massive new intrusion
into American privacy. Angry committee hearings were held.z°
The reality, again, was much less sinister.
The technical collection capabilities and resources of the
intelligence community have been deployed for decades in civilian
and homeland security applications. These capabilities were
historically deployed for civilian use on an ad hoc basis through the
Civilian Applications Committee ("CAC"). In June 2005, an
independent study group recommended that the U.S. Government
improve its ability to make available the technical collection
18. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., Rep. Jane Harman, Chair, H. Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info.
Sharing, and Terrorism Assessment, and Rep. Christopher P. Carney, Chairman,
H. Subcomm. on Mgmt, Investigations, and Oversight, to Michael Chertoff, Sec'y
of the Dept. of Homeland Sec., and Charles Allen, Assistant Sec'y for Intelligence
& Analysis, Dept. of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 6, 2007), available at
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments /20070907154522-02923.pdf (calling
for a moratorium on the office and arguing that there is "effectively no legal
framework" governing the domestic use of satellite imagery).
19. See, e.g., All Things Considered: New Office to Usher Domestic Use of Spy Satellites
(NPR radio broadcast Aug. 15, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyd=12819895).
20. See Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Implications of the National Applications Office Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
110th Cong. (2007) (video feed and prepared statements available at
http://homeland. house.gov/hearings/index.asp?ID=84).
5090 [Vol. 34:5
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capabilities and resources of the intelligence community for civilian
and homeland security applications.
These capabilities will now be deployed through a more
disciplined and systematic approach in the National Applications
Office (NAO). The Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
endorsed the establishment of the NAO and designated DHS as its
Executive Agent and Functional Manager.
The NAO does not collect intelligence. Its role is to review
civilian requests for access to certain technical intelligence
capabilities ("technical capabilities") and to endorse and prioritize
those requests that propose appropriate uses of the capabilities.
The NAO is limited to evaluating requests for civil, homeland
security, and, potentially, law enforcement use of these capabilities.
The NAO may also perform the limited additional function in
certain cases of analyzing and packaging lawfully-collected
information into a tailored product that meets the legitimate needs
of the requester. The NAO will not accept requests from law
enforcement agencies until the scope, lawfulness, and
appropriateness of the proposed use of technical capabilities has
been assessed and agreed upon by the Department and other
relevant parties.
The NAO's first priority is to ensure observance of the law.
Thus, the NAO has no plans to endorse any use of technical
capabilities that exceed the lawful authority of the requesting
agency. In particular, if a proposed use requires a warrant or
consent under the laws and Constitution of the United States, the
NAO does not endorse that use unless it is satisfied that the
requirement will be met.
Many requests for access to technical capabilities have a long
history of endorsement by the CAC. Typical uses of these
capabilities included: saving lives through support to forest
firefighters, support to the U.S. Coast Guard for search and rescue
operations, and support to response teams following a disaster;
assessment of readiness in advance of a natural disaster; damage
assessment following the occurrence of a natural disaster, such as
hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods; geospatial mapping; and
environmental studies relating to geologic features, forestation,
studies of wildlife, and other environmental research.
The constitutional protections that apply to the NAO depend
on a number of factors, including the location of the target,
individual, or activity to be observed, which informs the
2008] 5091
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determination of whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy. To a certain extent, the type of technology utilized may be
a factor. For example, the "open fields" line of cases makes clear
that the surveying of open fields from the air does not constitute a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his open
fields." Thus, satellite surveillance of "open fields" or activities
conducted within those areas will not trigger Fourth Amendment
protection, regardless of the method or technology employed. By
contrast, if the government uses highly sophisticated equipment
not generally available to the public to observe activities in an
individual's home, particularly details that are not otherwise
observable with a naked eye, a warrant or consent may be
2required.
Requests for the use of intelligence community imagery
capabilities through the NAO must also be consistent with the23
Posse Comitatus Act. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the U.S.
Army and Air Force (and the National Guard when acting under
federal or Title 10 authority) from direct or active military
participation in civilian law enforcement activities. Similar
principles enacted in Department of Defense regulations prohibit
the use of Marines or Navy personnel in a similar manner. Indirect
or passive military support to civilian law enforcement is
permissible and must be consistent with Executive Order 12,333
24and Department of Defense procedures. Any request that may
involve a military-controlled capability (whether people or
property) is carefully analyzed, taking into consideration the
authority under which the capability will be used, the source of
funding, and other factors, to determine if the use would constitute
"direct or active" or "indirect or passive" military participation in
civilian law enforcement activities.
To assure that these rules are followed, every agency or
organization requesting the use of the intelligence community's
technical intelligence capabilities will submit an annual
memorandum that both defines its requirements and intended
uses and specifies the legal and policy restrictions governing use of
any information provided. The proposed uses will be screened by
21. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
22. See generally Kyllov. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
24. See United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 922-23 (D.S.D. 1975).
5092 [Vol. 34:5
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the NAO staff to identify special uses requiring further review
within the Department. The NAO staff will be assisted by the DHS
Office of General Counsel and by other policy, privacy, and civil
liberties offices as those offices deem necessary. In reviewing the
proposed uses, the staff of the NAO is encouraged to consult with
other departments and agencies. During their review, the staff will
give careful scrutiny to any uses that fit into the following
categories:
* The collection is requested for or reasonably expected
to reveal information about the activities of U.S.
persons or other persons in the United States;
" The collection supports any law enforcement
organization or other U.S. agency/department that is
performing statutory and authorized law enforcement
functions;
* The collection supports a regulatory enforcement
organization or purpose, or could reasonably be
expected to support or become involved in regulatory
enforcement proceedings;
* The anticipated use of collected imagery is likely to
result in a request to disclose classified sources or
methods or presents a risk of unapproved disclosure of
such sources and methods;
* The nature of the imagery collected could reasonably
be considered intrusive or could reasonably be
considered to raise privacy issues;
25. Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.6, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,951 (Dec. 4,1981),
authorizes the intelligence community to provide limited support to law
enforcement authorities. With regard to the NAO, the intelligence community
may (1) render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement
authorities not precluded by applicable law; (2) when lives are endangered,
provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert
personnel to support local law enforcement agencies; and (3) provide specialized
equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel for use by any
department or agency. Despite the ability of the intelligence community to
provide this support, the NAO will not process any request on behalf of law
enforcement agencies, unless and until the National Applications Executive
Committee determines appropriate limits on and procedures for doing so.
2008] 5093
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* The requested collection otherwise raises novel or
significant legal or policy issues.
After this screening, the NAO will determine whether to
endorse a request and how it should be prioritized. If it is assessed
that a request may fit in one of the above categories, this will be
highlighted in the request package that is forwarded to the
appropriate intelligence community for its review and final
decision.
To further ensure that any decisions regarding these uses
receive the highest level review, DHS has committed that certain
categories of proposed uses must be referred to an internal review
committee consisting of the leaders of the Policy, Office of General
Counsel, and Intelligence & Analysis Directorates and receive the
endorsement of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary before the NAO
may endorse the use. In particular, these special uses include: (1)
any novel or significant homeland security uses, and (2) the
potential application of any new technology that has Fourth
Amendment implications.26
In determining whether a proposed use raises novel legal or
policy issues, the NAO takes into account limitations that may stem
from constitutionally based search and seizure rights, privacy
concerns, and restrictions on either the collection of information
about the activities of specific U.S. persons or the gathering of data
for a law enforcement purpose. New and emerging technologies
will also be reviewed to ensure that new policy and legal concerns
are not raised by their application to the specifics of a given
request.
In short, here again the counterrevolutionary reaction runs
grave risks. Because of fears of misuse-fears that are readily
answered through an internal oversight process and, no doubt,
through frequent Congressional review-critics have thought to
throw the baby out with the bath water and prohibit all use of
intelligence assets for non-intelligence purposes. Think about that
kind of overreaction next time you see a satellite photograph of a
fire in Southern California or a bridge collapse in the heartland of
Minnesota.
26. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States., 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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III. CONCLUSION
Trying to stop the deployment of new technology is like King
Canute trying to sweep back the tide. Using that development to
question settled practices is even more fruitless. Rather than vainly
trying to reverse progress and return to a time when we were not at
war, it is time (and perhaps past time) for the United States to
recognize the reality of what we face and to go about the business
of answering the hard questions of oversight and implementation.
The wrong reaction is the counterrevolutionary one of the
Thermidor-to discard not only new capabilities but to also
question ones of established utility.
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